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A complex system envisioned can accomplish a given
mission with the aid of any one of several alternative
structures. Each of these alternative structures (subsys-
tems)
,
although capable of mission accomplishment, exhibits
different levels of performance due to its component inven-
tory. The structures are ordered in preference accordingly.
Operation on less-preferred structures is a function of
component/structure failure histories in prior structures.
Failures are classified by three levels of severity. A
system effectiveness model is developed to provide a measure
of effectiveness for the overall complex system which encom-
passes all possible alternative structures.
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TABLE OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Symbol Meaning
S. Alternative structure j from the admissi-
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ble set of alternative structures
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C. Critical failure event in S.
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M. n Major failure event in S.3* J 3
m .
,
Minor failure event in S
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, g = 1,2,-.., G.} , the set of all
critical failures in S
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*tj \M.k , k = 1,2,..., Kj} the set of all
major failures in S
.
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K. im -^' £
= l#2,--», L.j , the set of all
minor failures in S
3
T Mission m duration time
X. , X .„ , X.. Failure rates associated with C. , M., ,jg' 3k' j4 jg' ;jk'
and m . . , respectively
t. , t .. , t . , Operation time during mission associatedjg' 3k' D^
with C. , M., , and m. „, respectivelyjg' :k' jl' ^
D .,
, n Degradation factor on effectiveness of
structure S.,, from the major failure M.,3+1 J jk
in S .
3
d.., Degradation factor on effectiveness of
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RC.(t) Probability of no critical failures in S.
during the time interval (0,t)
RM.(t) Probability of no major failures in S.
J J
during the time interval (0,t)
E. Alternative structure S. effectiveness
D J
(Probability of mission success on S.)
given no failures
E .' Average effectiveness of S. accounting for
major failures in structures S, ,S„, . . „ , S. -,J 1' 2 j-1
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nent I in S .
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first major failure in S .
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S. ) y. , , the minimum time for a sequence
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of major failures in structures
1 ' 9 ' " * " ' -i
fv P.DoF. for minimum time for a sequence of
j
"major failures in structures S, ,S OP • • • ,S .J 12]
KX. / X., , summation of major failure rates
k=l
for components in S
.
X. — / X. r approximated mean time to manor
: 3 i^1
i
failure in a sequence of major failures in
c q o . . qb
l'
& 2' ' j
RC . , (T-t) Probability structure S. , experiences no
critical failures in remaining mission
time (T-t)
RM . , (T-t) Probability structure S. , experiences no
major failures in remaining mission time
(T-t)
P. Probability structures S, , S~,«--, S.
j
* 1 2 ' j
experience major failures and no critical
failures , and S- -, experiences no major or
critical failures in (0,T)
E System effectiveness on mission m account-
in *
ing for all reliable alternative structures
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In light of the present day advancing technology, sys-
tems have become vastly complex. Coupled with this rise in
complexity has been a gradual increase in component and
system size, weight and/or cost. The rise in complexity in
just avionics systems over the 12-year period between 1953
and 1965 has been by a factor of 74, not to mention the ex-
pected complexity factor of 160 times the 1953 avionic sys-
tem for the year 1968. [l] None-the-less these new complex
systems cannot always incorporate redundant components or
subsystems due to size, weight, and/or cost constraints;
this is particularly true for an aircraft. However, there
may exist a less-sophisticated component or group of com-
ponents that can perform the same (or similar) function as
a complex component, but somehow in a less effective manner,
e.g., solution time longer, greater uncertainty in solution,
or lower probability of success. This less effective group
of components, "alternative structure", can also accomplish
the mission and thereby improves the overall system effec-
tiveness by a new form of redundancy, since the usual form
of redundancy implies equal effectiveness.
The foregoing concerning complex systems and associ-
ated constraints applies most assuredly to military weapons
systems being contemplated for aircraft, ship and submarine
platforms of the future.
I. PURPOSE OF THE SYSTEMS EFFECTIVENESS MODEL
In spite of the enormous complexities and the size,
weight and/or cost constraints, a weapons system must
still achieve a high mission reliability, usually in the
high nineties, where mission reliability is defined to be
"the probability of adequate system performance for the du-
ration of the mission in the usual mission environment."
In this paper adequate system performance will imply that
at least one alternative structure, i.e., a subsystem ca-
pable of mission accomplishment, remains operable. An
operable structure by definition experiences only repair-
able type (minor) failures during a mission.
The problem is to develop a model to measure the over-
all system effectiveness which incorporates the effects of
availability, conditioned effectiveness and the component/
structure failure degradation over all admissible alterna-
tive structures. The measure of system effectiveness
derived, hopefully, will approximate the "systems perform-
ance effectiveness" defined as "a measure of the extent to
which a system can be expected to complete its assigned
mission within the time frame under the stated environment-
al conditions." [2]
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The United States Navy currently has under development
several new complex weapons systems to cope with the growing
submarine threat. The P3C patrol aircraft, being developed
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by Lockheed at Burbank, California, and under evaluation by
the ASW Projects Office, Washington, D.C., is one such weap-
ons system. The revolutionary weapons system incorporates
a variety of sophisticated detection sensors in a complex
computerized system design. For each of the several mis-
sions of the P3C aircraft, there exists a set of alternative
structures of components feasible to the accomplishment of
that mission. The ultimate purpose of this effectiveness
model is to obtain a quantitative measure to be used in de-
sign alteration comparisons in the P3C aircraft.
The alternative structured approach for the P3C air-
craft seems practicable for the following reasons: (1) by
the nature of the aircraft/submarine detection and tracking
problem, the structure most effective for a mission may
change during a mission engagement as a result of environ-
mental or target tactics, and (2) by reason of limited
weight and space requirements aboard an aircraft, a failure
may occur to cause an operating structure to be inoperative
(non-repairable) for the remainder of the mission. Either
of these reasons necessitates operation on another alterna-
tive structure, usually of different performance and/or re-
liability.
The mathematical model developed by Zagor, et al., [3]
for computing the reliability of a hypothetical multi-model
fire control system treated a similar system redundancy
variation. In the Zagor model the system effectiveness of
a three mode hypothetical fire control system was formulated
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accounting for mode effectiveness and mode likelihood. The
system effectiveness model to be described in Chapter II
and derived mathematically in Chapter III takes into con-
sideration three levels of failure severity : failures
unacceptable to mission accomplishment, failures permissi-




DESCRIPTION AND FORMULATION OF MODEL
A particular mission of a complex system can be accom-
plished by any one of several alternative structures (sub-
systems) of the system components. The alternative struc-
tures are composed of components in logical series and are
ordered in preference by their attainable degree of mission
performance. Component failures in this complex system are
grouped into three classes of severity, namely critical,
major and minor failures. Component failures that are not
allowable in the accomplishment of the mission, and as such
cause mission abort when they occur, are defined as critical
failures. A major failure is one whose occurrence precludes
any further operation with the associated structure during
mission, i.e., forces a shift to a lower priority structure,
and may result in degrading the effectiveness of an alterna-
tive structure. Component failures repairable during a mis-
sion by on-board repair parts are defined as minor failures.
Minor failures degrade structure/system effectiveness (per-
haps proportional to structure down-time or function lost)
but do not require a shift to another alternative struc-
ture. This model establishes a functional relationship to
quantify the overall system effectiveness taking into con-
sideration the various performance levels and reliabilities
of all mission-orientated alternative structures.
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The primary or priority one alternative structure is
that structure capable of obtaining the greatest degree of
mission performance due to its sophisticated component de-
sign. The priority one structure, S, , may in a particular
system include all components of the system. However, this
is usually not the case since most complex systems incorpo-
rate redundant components (components that will perform the
same function) having a lower performance capability. The
performance of the priority one structure in a failure-free
environment is primarily a function of three variables,
namely : (1) the state of the art in component/system engi-
neering design, (2) the environmental operating factors en-
countered during a mission, and (3) the component operator's
state of training and performance levels. However, there
exists some average level of effectiveness, E? , realized
when operating the system utilizing the primary structure
S, in a failure-free environment. But when failures occur,
structure/system effectiveness becomes degraded.
For a particular mission a complex system has the set
of admissible alternative structures {s., j = 1,2, ».°, j}
ordered in preference. Each alternative structure S. has*
3
associated with it the sets of components susceptable to
critical, major and minor failures, i.e., & . „ %.. and $C.
respectively, where
3
*j = ^C jl< Cj2< ••• ' Cjg' ••• • CjG










, represent the events of critical, major
and minor failures in structure S., respectively. Similar-
ly, X. # X.^, X.^ and t . , t. k# t. A correspond to the
component failure rates and operating durations for the
components in &
.
, #?. and K., respectively. The effective-
ness of a system experiencing a critical (abort type) fail-
ure will be by definition equal zero. The major failures
are those failures which are non-repairable during the mis-
sion and which force system operation into an alternative
structure of less desirable performance. This less effect-
ive structure is also susceptible to degradation from the
major failure(s) in prior structure (s) . Let the degrada-
tion factor, D., . , , be defined as the degradation factor
on structure S., n resulting from event M., in structure S..
Minor failures also connote a degrading effect, but the de-
gradation factor is applied to present structure effective-
ness. Now d. . . denotes the degradation factor on struc-
3 *# 3
ture S. due to the event m . „ in S.. Several assumptions are
now made about the component failure distributions.
Independent exponential failure time distributions are
assumed on all components and on all subassemblies whose
failure is a critical, major, or minor event. The failure
rate, X, of a component is the same regardless of the alter-
native structure in which it is operating. The failure
rates of components in non-operating states are equal to
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zero. If a particular component in the system is suscept-
ible to more than one class of failure, then that component
will be subdivided into pseudo components affected by only
one class of failure for ease of formulation of the model.
The effect of failures on mission performance will now be
considered.
From the preceding discussion of failure types and con-
sidering a particular system design, one can enumerate the
success paths (system failure histories) such that the mis-
sion will still be accomplished, but degraded in varying
amounts by the effects of associated failures. To obtain a
quantified measure of effectiveness that incorporates the
flexibility in performance and reliability in an alterna-
tive structured system, the system effectiveness model is
formulated below encompassing all possible success paths in
the accomplishment of the mission.
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CHAPTER III
SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS MODEL DERIVATION
Mission accomplishment is associated with the greatest
system effectiveness when no critical or major failures
occur during the mission duration (0,T) . In this particular
"success path", i.e., no failure in the primary structure
S , the overall system effectiveness is the product of E,
(the average effectiveness of structure S, accounting for
minor failure degradation effects) times the probability of
no critical or major failures. Let RC.(t) and RM.(t) be
respectively the probability of no critical and of no major
failures in structure S. during time (o,t). Then, if only
one structure existed for a particular system, the system
effectiveness would be
E = E., x RC,(T) x RM, (T).
However, in the complex system envisioned here, there are
several alternative structures feasible to the accomplish-
ment of mission, and the alternative structures are utiliz-
ed when preferred structures fail. As such, system effec-
tiveness must account for this incremental effectiveness
obtained via alternative structures when these same struc-
tures are probable.
The formulation of such a model accounting for the
effectiveness of all alternative structures weighted by
each structure's probability of being utilized follows:
17
as
System Effectiveness on Mission m (E ) is modeledJ m




RC, (T) = Probability of no critical failures in S.,
during mission
= eXP
- I X lg fclc
\g=i
RM, (T) = Probability of no major failures in S, during
mission
K-,
exp - I X tIk "Ik
k=l
E. = Average structure S. effectiveness accounting
for degradation from major failures in prior
structures and degradation from minor failures
in S .
D
P = Probability structure S,, S
2 * .
.
» » S. each
experience a major and no critical failure,
and S. , experiences no major or critical
failures in (0,T) '
i Accounts for all (J) admissible alternative structure
effectiveness given the structure is reliable*
During mission hereafter denoted by (0,T)
.
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Now E- is obtained in the following manner. First of
all, it is assumed that the effectiveness of performance
level of any particular alternative structure given no fail-
ures, defined as E . , is known or may be estimated by Opera-
nttional exercises. The E. represents the nominal structure
3
S . effectiveness for the current state of the art, the en-
3
vironmental operating factors encountered, and the opera-
•ktor performance level as discussed previously. But E. must
account for (i.e., be degraded by, when appropriate) the
effect of major failures in prior structures S, , S~,...,S._,
on structure S.. Letting D., . be the degradation factor
on S. from the first major failure M., in structure S., for
j
J lk i
i < j, it follows that
j-1 Ki
E .' = E* ) ) D., . (probability first major failure
3 3
i=l k=l *
' : in S
i
is Mik
y y d, v . / v ikj L L Dik,j [ k±i=l k=l
k'=l
where EJ is identically E, , and
E .' = Average effectiveness of S. accounting for major
failures in structures S, , S , ..., S. -. .
1 2 j-1
' When a major failure has no degradation effect on a
structure, then the degradation factor is zero.
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where the term in parentheses above is derived in Appendix A.
A particular alternative structure S. effectiveness
should also take into consideration the several success
paths under various minor failure histories within that
structure. Therefore a weighted average of the E .' , defin-
ed above, where the weights are the products of the various
probabilities of minor failure (s) and the associated minor
failure (s) degradation seems plausible for an average struc-
ture effectiveness E. capability. Formulating the above we
obtain, assuming independent exponential distributions, the
following:




\ /", "\ /Prob. m . , , occurs\ / Prob, no other




, . , fr ,
3l
'3yv^ .is/ and m \ /
Prob . no
v=i r=i / — ~j!- " ~ ther minor>
l" > V 1 occur in \\ failures in
\S. in (0,T)/ \S. in (0,T]
+ c (small order terms)
Inserting the probabilistic results derived in Appendix B,
t
it follows that
A more conservative approximation would be obtained by

















+ E. Kdji\jXdJr,j 1-e
+ e (small order terms) •
Simplification to the calculation of the E. terms.
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discarding the higher order terms when input data shows
them to be insignificant.
P., the probability that structures S-. , S~,'**, S.
each experience a major and no critical failure, and struc-
ture S. , experiences no major or critical failures in(0,T)
is obtained as follows. Let Y., be the minimum |t,,, ,T ., 2 ». . ./
T.,„ where T.,, is the time to event M.,, (major failure
3 K . , J J K . J K
21












, S."', with the assumption of zero switching
time between alternative structures. Let fy (t) be the pro-
J
bability density function of the time for a sequence of





S1# S 2 ,...,S. fail major,
S, ,S~/ . .
.
,S . not fail critical,
S. t not fail major for remainder of mission,3+1 J





















3 = l^ 2 . J-l
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is a gamma P. D.F. [4] , where equal structure X. (mean time to
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Assuming that] RC.,(t) =1 RC .
,
(T) , then Eq. (5)
becomes
j"=i D















Examining Eq. (6) for a few small j values, we obtain
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Each of the integral expressions in P.. , P» and P may be
transformed into incomplete gamma functions (P, degenerates
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The latter is obtained by the substitution, s = F^t.
The Incomplete Gamma Function is evaluated from Incom-
plete Gamma tables or readily from Poisson tables, after
















Now that all terms of equation (1) have been formula-
ted, each may be evaluated with proper input and inserted







"The effective performance of Navy systems in fleet
use is essential to successful Navy operations." [l] The
alternative structure concept of a complex weapons system
seems to have merit in the improvement of '-' system perfor-
mance effectiveness." The P3C aircraft contains a complex
system that is recognized to have such a structure due to
the nature of its mission.
In the preceding chapters a complex mission oriented
system composed of a set of ordered alternative structures
(any one of which are capable of mission accomplishment)
was described. The preference ordering of structures was
assumed to be by performance. Failures of components of a
structure were classified into one of three levels of
severity: critical, major or minor failure. The effects
of failures on system effectiveness were accounted for by
degradation factors, such that a critical failure caused
total degradation or mission abort, a major failure comple-
tely degraded the current structure, and a minor failure
(repairable) partially degraded the current structure.
A mathematical model for the above system design was
then developed to obtain a quantitative measure of the over-
all system effectiveness reflecting the capability or multi-




Several assumptions and approximations (presumably-
conservative) were made in obtaining a closed form solution.
In any application of the model the assumptions and limita-
tions must be considered. First of all, the model applies
to a specific kind of system design. The measure of effec-
tiveness obtained from the model can only be as good as the
input data; consequently, failure rates, performance and
degradation factors, etc, should be revised to reflect
current knowledge. If independent exponential failures
cannot be assumed, then the model must be modified or used
with discretion. When the assumption can be accepted, this
model affords a straight-forward solution with the proper
input paramters,
III. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
Further research effort is needed to test the model
(for example by simulation techniques) for its sensitivity,
with current P3C design parameters. While this model treats
a major failure as a trigger to cause a shift in alterna-
tive structure, the model could be altered to address the
problem of a structure shift due to a target tactical ma-
neuver. This preliminary model when validated could by
simulations provide insight into the effects of changing on-
board repair parts and altering a component structure fail-
28
ure severity by incorporation of redundant components. In
this way, design revision results in terms of "system per-
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APPENDIX A
1. Derivation of Probability
f
First major failure
in S. is M.,
1 lk
Let T., = the random variable time to major fail-lk J
ure M., .lk
Tik ~ exP< Xik >







>t) P (Ti2 >t)
• • • P (TiK ±>t)









Prob. | First major failure! = Prob. (^T., < V
in S. is M.,
l ik
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Tik











1. Derivation of Probability / No minor failures
in S . in (0,T)
:
Let X. „ = the random variable time minor failure
X.., t. . = failure rate and operation duration of
the component t in structure S.
Prob. ( No minor failures
in S . in (0,T)





2. Derivation of Prob. /m . ,
,
occurs! Prob. | No other minor]
in S
.
1 V failures in
in (0,T) / \ S . in (0,T)'
= Prob-.Tx.
„




3. Derivation of Prob. / m. . . % , m.,„ \ Prob. /No other minor
occur in I \ failures in
k
S. in (0,T)/ \ S. in (0,T),
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follows similarly and is given by
L.
3





T lAuTi e-xt dt . y ixni e -xT
i=j
where X is the mean rate of occurrence of failures.
Let F.(T) = Probability that the time to occurrence
D
4-Vi
of the j major failure event will be
less than T ( represented by the term on
left of the identity above)
.
then, 1 - F.(T) = Probability that the time to occurrence
of the j major failure event will be
greater than T,
and equivalently
1 - F.(T) = Probability that the number of major
failure events in the time to T is
less than j
.
Since the major failure events are happening in accordance
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